Open Access and Public Domain Availability in Developing Countries

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#### **Plan of Presentation**

Guiding questions How is science done in DCs? Comparative advantages of science in DCs Production of databases in DCs Differences in Access in ICs and DCs The market of DBs in DCs Anti-trust and subsidies Conclusion

#### Guiding questions

How is scientific knowledge produced in developing countries? Do scientists in DCs use information differently? Are DBs produced differently in DCs? Are the impacts of DB sui-generis protection on science different for DCs?

### Guiding questions (II)

- Are institutional arrangements (such as public domain, fair use and differential pricing) relevant for the development of science DCs, as shown they are for science in ICs (Reichman Uhlir, 2000)?
- Are compensatory direct subsidies viable?
- Summing up, what are the consequences of sui-generis DB protection for international scientific cooperation of DCs?
- Contention: characterizing how science operates in DCs allows to answer these questions directly.

A framework for comparison: "Consolidated" and "Emergent" Science (states in the dynamic evolution of science)

Consolidated science:

- A concept akin to Kuhn's "normal science".
- Diffusion and transfer may be assumed to be virtually costless.

*Emergent science:* 

- Diffusion of knowledge cannot be assumed to be costless.
- Replication of experiments demands heavy investments (equipment and sometimes new labs.)

#### Science in DCs

Similarities with Emergent Science in Industrialized Countries

- Replication of all experiments demands heavy investments.
- % of equipment in budgets is high.
- The process of networking and "interessing" peers is demanding.

Similarities with Consolidated Science in ICs

- Expected results are in general "normal".
- Reliance on information is critical

Differences between science in DCs and both "emergent" and "consolidated" science in ICs

Even the replication of simple normal science experiments demands high investments
(Because of sparsity of infrastructure).

Even in simple "normal science" projects, information resources must be built from scratch (to compensate for the sparsity of information infrastructure – libraries and databases).

## Other specificities of science in DCs

Financial resources are scarce.

 High share of library, documentation and travel expenses in project budgets. 7 benefits for world scientific community of incorporating scientists from DCs (Forero & Jaramillo, 2002)

- 1. "putting information in the hands of a more diverse population of researchers" (David Foray 1995)
- 2. When cooperation network is wider, results may add up.
- □ 3. Wider set of validating peers.
- 4. Questioning of paradigms from diverse experimentation environments.
- 5. Providing diversity of environments in metaresearch.
- 6. Sharing funding and execution of big-science projects in varied geographical scenarios.
- 7. Addressing wider range of problems, not in priorities of IC communities.

International Networking and Scientific Information Needs in DCs

- Important role of altruism and interest of scientist in Ics in meeting information needs in DCs.
- Developing & transition countries have creted networks of expatriated scientist mobilizing scientific altruism and interest (Forero 1997).
- International scientific collaboration plays important role in DCs scientific research.
- Fair use of copyrighted information has been critical (because of sparsity of library resources).

The counterpart: need for additional networking efforts in DCs.

Additional argument: comparative advantages of DCs researchers

- Comparison of efficiency of DCs in different types of research:
- Costs of equipment considerably higher than costs of information. This drives researchers in DCs towards:
  - Theoretical research in all fields;
  - Evidence-based research (medicine and social practice)
  - Environmental, climatic, econometric and even genetic research based on internationally available data;
  - Case-based or best-practices research in management and technology applications.

Conclusion: DCs have comparative advantage for information-intensive research, provided access to info is maintained and enhanced.


#### Production of databases in DCs

- Highly concentrated in North America and Western Europe (94 % of 12,111 listed by Gale Directory of Databases – cited by Braunstein 2002).
- Gale does not cover all databases. Gale 21 for South America, Pereira 694 for Brazil. Gale 413 for all Asia, Vandrevala mentions 400-500 for only the science sector in India. Gale lists globally traded. Most in DCs are Governmental, legislative, library not globally sold.
- \*Local interest.
- Many not digitalized.
- Provided with no charge.
- Concentration reported by Gale still reflects North-South balance of payments for DBs.

#### Network limitations to access


DCs have important infrastructure limitations for competing in the world market of databases.


They are illustrated in the following graphs, based on statistics collected by Kirkman, Sachs (2001) for 75 countries and calculations made for this presentation.



Lorenz Curve - Internet Access

85 % of Internetusers are incountries with20 % of worldPopulation.





Lorenz Curves for Income & Internet Access

The concentration of Internet access is higher than that of income.

#### Network "readiness" and size:

Kirkman-Sachs
network-readiness
index (0 is highest
possible, 100 is
lowest):

- DCs average: 55.8
- OECD average: 18.6

Average population of countries in K-S survey: - DCs: 101 million - OECD: 37 million But average size of networks is considerably higher in OECD: \*Average size telephone network: **DCs** 8.040.951 **OECD** 20.239.590 \*Average Size Internet (# Users): 1.570.478 DCs **OECD** 12.292.560

### Four important economic consequences of statistical analysis:

 \*Less opportunity in DCs to take advantage of network economies.
\* Therefore, less potential for database development.  \*Though database markets appear to be global, database development is linked to data production.
Data production is also concentrated.

Paradox:

- Most databases in DCs are of local interest.
- More difficult market entry in DCs.

# The market for IC databases in DCs (I: pricing)

■ \*As in al network products (Ox Shy, 2000), there is incentive to use "introductory prices": (20,000 in country A vs. 6,000 in Country B). Differential pricing is common practice and University Consortia have been succesful in obtaining important discounts:

- \*Example of differential pricing:
  - Posted price: 50,000
  - Price paid by University consortium in country A: 20,000
  - In Country B: 6,000
- University Consortia have been a succesful strategy in DCs for negotiating access to databases.

The market for IC databases in DCs (II: high transaction costs) **There is a dense network of intermediaries** operating in DCs. □ In Andean countries, at least 5 intermediaries. \*"Negotiations with intermediaries are considerable harder", according to the manager of one university consortium.

The market for IC databases in DCs (III: incentives for In the case of Europe, In DCs: Lopez (2002): "... we have not observed that infant new database firms DB industry in the region increased sharply for (apparently concentrated in the most advanced countries) one or two years after is being affected by the Directive, not absence of sui-generis afterwards (Maurer, legislation. Commercial losses seem instead to derive from Onsrud et al. in an inadequate enforcement". *Science*, 2000)

But more research is needed, as well as a longitudinal follow up of the Mexican experience. It would be erroneous to generalize on Mexico's experience, a member of Nafta, a circumstance which weights heavily in results.

The market for IC databases in DCs (IV: Sui-generis protection and network pricing and incentives)

 Is there statistical evidence of a higher increase of prices in DBs from Europe and the US? It would be a mistake to interpret this lack of evidence as evidence against:

> DB market is incipient, so network-pricing strategies are at work (introductory prices).

### Anti-trust laws and direct subsidies

#### □ The argument:

If pricing practices are undesirable, use antitrust laws.

 If legal prices are undesirable for income distribution or externality reasons, use subsidies. □ Is it viable?

 Undesirable pricing practices are used internationally, but antitrust laws and enforcement are not evenly practiced (transactions costs of suing are excessive).

Who is going to collect the taxes to finance subsidies, whether internationally or in the legislature of DB-rich countries?

#### Conclusion (1)

The arguments presented here -based on a stylized analytical description of how science is produced in DCs - are different from those of other authors who have dealt with the impact of DB protection on DCs, though the conclusions are similar.

The conclusions differ from those of other authors (Braunstein for instance) who presents a nice institution-less overview of a classical argument in favor of protection, without taking into account the specific ways of producing science in developing countries.

#### Conclusion (II)

If one adopts a view where institutions and the ways of doing science matter, then the fair use exception of copyright over original material as well as non-original databases, the disclosure provision of patent law and effective limits to the time span of property rights appear to be fundamental for the advancement of science in developing countries.